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Chapter One
 
Introduction
 
Pharmaceutical companies' operating strategies have
 
historically heen to invest heavily in leading-edge research
 
and development (R & D) that results in a steady stream of
 
new and better products. In turn, they rely on the sales
 
of products under patent protection to fund the R and D
 
that results in tommorow's therapies. Adequate patent
 
protection and reforms in Pood and Drug Administration (PDA)
 
regulatory review are the keys to continued success of this
 
operating formula.
 
Because of increasing scientific sophistication, the
 
regulatory review process has lengthened. The lengthened
 
review process has caused a decline in patent protection
 
in the pharmaceutical industry. The current effective pa
 
tent life (time left on the life of exclusive marketing
 
before the patent expires and the drug is available for gen
 
eric marketing) has now dwindled from the 17 year patent to
 
an average of less than seven years. This has resulted in
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declining incentives for pharmaceutical R and D. Histori
 
cally, this research has immeasurahly improved the lives of
 
many people, strengthened the United States trade balance
 
and provided employment and other economic and social benefits.
 
In 1982, it is estimated that the United States Pharma
 
ceutical Industry contributed $1.7 billion to the United
 
States balance of trade. However, studies show that since
 
I960 the research efforts and innovational output of U.S.
 
pharmaceutical firms have deteriorated compared with Western
 
Europe and Japanese competitors, which are now enjoying R and
 
D incentives and recently lengthened patent terms in their
 
home markets, U.S. pharmaceutical companies are concerned
 
that U.S. policies will place them at a future disadvantage
 
to foreign competitors.^
 
The United States system of patent protection was de
 
signed to ensure innovative manufacturers a seventeen year
 
2
 
period of exclusive marketing for their inventions. In
 
the pharmaceutical industry, in order to permit free exchange
 
of information in the scientific community and protect the
 
discovery, a patent must be filed as soon as a compound is
 
found to be biologically active. However, before the drug
 
can be marketed it must go through a period of development
 
and testing and be subjected to regulatory review.
 
Since 1836, when the U.S. Patent Act was passed, rapid
 
ly growing scientific sophistication has permitted much more
 
rigorous and intensive scrutiny of new pharmaceutical pro
 
ducts. In 1962, amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
 
Act mandated greater regulatory testing of new pharmaceu
 
tical products before marketing,^ (see table 1)
 
This testing assures both the company and the public
 
that new drugs are safe and effective. But lengthy develop
 
ment and pre-market regulatory review for new drugs, conduc
 
ted while the patent clock ticks away, has reduced the
 
period during which the innovator has the exclusive right
 
to market the products of its research.
 
A substantial decline in the length of patent pro
 
tection for new pharmaceutical product compounds has been
 
found by the Center for the Study of Drug Development of
 
the University of Rochester. The average life of compound
 
patents for new pharmaceutical products approved to market
 
in i960 was 17 years. This fell to 15.7 years in 1965» to
 
14.5 years in 1970, to 9.6 years in 1975, to 7.1 years in
 
1980 and 6.8 years in 1981.^ (see table 2) Although the
 
PDA lia-s introduced reforms aimed at speeding up new drug
 
approvals, experts estimate this will not result in more
 
6

than one or two years of patent life.
 
At the same time the period for patent protection has
 
decreased, the cost and time required for the development
 
of new pharmaceutical products has increased. The average
 
cost to the pharmaceutical industry of developing a new
 
drug rose from $4 million in 1962, when FDA efficacy
 
'TABLE 1
 
Years Required To Develop A Drug
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of Drug Development 
testing requirements were enacted, to more than $54 million
 
in 1976. Some experts place it at as much as $87 million
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today.
 
In 1962, the average development time for a new drug
 
was 2 years. By 1976, the average time from the filing
 
of the Investigational New Drug (Il'lD) application to New
 
Q
 
Drug Approval (LEIA) had risen to nearly nine years, (see
 
tahle 3)
 
The pharmaceutical industry is highly research-intensive.
 
It consistently spends 11,5 percent of sales on research
 
and development, compared to 2 percent for U,S, industry
 
generally. Pharmaceutical companies have consistently
 
increased their current dollar investments in research and
 
development. However, much of this increase has been absorbed
 
Q
 
by inflation. Moreover, a recent survey of U,S, firms by
 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
 
shows that there has been a shift in dollars to the devel
 
opment part of the R and D process because of the tremendous
 
resources it now requires,'"^
 
Traditionally, financial returns from sales during
 
the patent period have been sufficient to provide incentives
 
for drug innovation. However, a patent term that is reduced
 
by ten years in not a sufficiently strong investment for
 
companies concerned about high risk and increasing cost,
 
complexity and time of research and development.
 
TABLE 3
 
EFFECTIVE PATENT LIFE FOR NEW DRUG APPROVALS
 
1980-81
 
Effaettvc 
Product Brand Generic Name Vlanufaaurer FDA Date of Patent Issue Patent Life 
Name NDA Approval Date (Yean)^ 
ASENDIN amoxapine Lederle ^22-80 8-1-72 8.86 
CALDEROL caldfe^oi Upjohn 8-5-80 9-3-74 11.08 
CINOBAC dnoxacin LiUy 6-13-80 6-13-72 9.00 
LUDIOMIL maprotiline HC Ciba-Geigy 12-1-80 8-27-68 4.74 
MECLAN medocydine Ortho 5-30-80 5-16-61 0.00 
MECLOMEN medofenamate Na Wamer/Lambert 
Park Davis 6-25-80 4-11-67 3.79 
SISEPTIN sisomidn SO4 Schering 10-29-80 9-23-75 11.90 
VANSIL oxamniquine Pfizer 7-23-80 6-28-74 10.93 
VIROPTIC thfluridine Burroughs-Weiicome 4-10-80 8-17-65 2.35 
YUTOPAR ritodrine HQ Merreii-National 8-29-80 11-12-68 5.21 
ZOMAX zomepirac NA McNdi 10-28-80 8-14-73 9.79 
BUPRENEX buprenorphine Norwich-Eaton 12-29-81 3-18-69 4J2 
CAPOTEN captroprii Squibb 4-06-81 8-08-78 14.34 
CARAFATE sucraifate Marion 10-30-81 3-11-69 4J6 
CLAFORAN cefotaxime NA Hoechst-Roussd 3-11-81 5-01-79 15.14 
DESYREL trazodone Mead Johnson 12-21-81 4-30-68 3J6 
EMCYT estramustine Roche 12-24-81 1-07-67 2M 
FANSIDER sulfadoxine Roche 10-28-81 5-03-66 1.51 
pyrimethamine 
ISOPTIN verapamil KnoU 8-12-81 7-19-66 1.93 
LOPID gemhbrozii Wamer/Lambert 12-21-81 * 7-04-72 
sMEZLIN mezlodilin Miles 9-21-81 8-10-76 11.89 
MIDAMOR amiloride HCl Merck 10-05-81 4-13-67 2.52 
MOXAM moxalactam disodium LiUy 10-06-81 2-06-79 14J4 
NASALIDE flunisoiide Syntex 9-24-81 3-24-64 .01 
NIZORAL ketoconazole Janssen 6-12-81 6-15-82 18.00 
PAXIPAM haiazepam Schering 9-24-81 2-25-69 4.42 
PIPRACIL piperadlliin Lederie 12-29-81 9-05-78 13.68 
PRCXTARDIA nifedipine Pfizer 12-31-81 12-23-69 4.98 
PROSTIN VR 
PEDIATRIC alprostadil Upjohn 10-16-81 12-18-62 0.00 
PROVENTIL 
(VENTONN) albuteroi Schering(Glaxo) 5-01-81 2-22-72 7.81 
RESTORIL temazepam Sandoz 2-27-81 1-03-67 2.85 
TENATHAN bethanidine Robins 5-29-81 2-02-65 0.68 
sulfate 
TENORMIN atenolol Stuan-lCI 8-19-81 5-16-72 7.74 
XANAX aiprazolam Upjohn 10-16-81 10-19-76 12.01 
Avenge Effective Paieat Life:1980— 7.1 yean.
 
'1901 —0.0 yean
 
NOTES:
 
1)Aho approvei in 1980 were(rimethopnin and bacampidllin which are noi considered NCEs by our critena.
 
2)aIso atipros'ed in 1981 were four diagnostics(saralasin. secreiin. isosuifan Uue.cerulalide) which are not considered NCEs by our criteria.
 
Soweti 1980 and 1981—The Center for the Study of Drug Oevejopment. University of Rochester, Rochester, NY.
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In 1970, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
 
members tested 704,000 compounds for pharmaceutical activity.
 
Only 1,000 proved promising and safe enough to move onto
 
human clinical tests, and only about 12 percent of these
 
ever reached the market.^^ Dr. Henry Grabowski, Puke
 
University Economist, has noted that the majority of new
 
drug introductions do not cover their full research and
 
development investment when one allows for discovery costs
 
12
 
and the attrition rate on new product candidates. In order
 
to provide incentives for pharmaceutical companies to con
 
tinue to invest in R and 5, restoration of adequate patent
 
protection is extremely important. This move may provide
 
incentives that provide the financial basis for research
 
programs begun today and extending for years into the future.
 
The tremendous reduction of infectious disease by
 
antibiotics, the virtual elimination of TB, measles and
 
smallpox and continuing advances against high blood pressure
 
and heart disease are just part of the record of the U,S,
 
pharmaceutical industry's achievements in the past three
 
decades. These advances are the combined efforts of pharma­
ceutucal company scientists as well as scientists working
 
in universities with grants provided by the pharmaceutical
 
industry. It is a record matched by few other industries,
 
(see table 4)
 
Measured in prolonged life, in return to activity, in
 
extended productivity, the benefits from drugs and vaccines
 
8
 
TABLE 4
 
Reductions In U.S. Cases Of Selected Diseases, 1940-1980
 
Percent Form of
 
Disease 1240 1980 Reduction Treatment
 
Diptheria 15,536 3 99.9 Vaccines
 
Measles 291,162 13,506 95.4 Vaccines
 
Polio 57,879 9 99.9 Vaccines
 
Syphilis 472,900 68,832 85.4 Antibiotics
 
Tetanus	 486 95 80.5
 Vaccines
 
Tuberculosis 102,984 27,749 73.1 Anti-infectiv
 
Typhoid Fever 9,809 510 94.8 Vaccines &
 
Antibiotics
 
Whooping Cough 183,866 1,730 99.1 Vaccines
 
Source; 	University of Rochester Center for the';Study of
 
Drug Development
 
 to millions of individuals are extraordinary. New drug
 
therapies also avert costly surgical treatment and hospitali-r
 
. 14
 
zation and result in significant health care cost savings,
 
(see table 5)
 
The objective of this study is to investigate the po
 
tential relationship between patent, product substitution
 
and regulatory policies and United States R and D in the
 
pharmaceutical industry. Specifically, (1) do regulatory
 
policies in the U,S, decrease the number of drugs released
 
on the foreign markets, (2) Would passage of the Patent Term
 
Restoration Act likely increase the amount of money firms
 
allocate for R and U, (3) will tax breaks for increased R and
 
D in the U,S, encourage more R and D in the pharmaceutical
 
industry, (4) do generic drug manufacturers support these
 
legislative reforms, and (5) will PDA reforms in the regula
 
tory review process of NDAs encourage more R and D in the
 
pharmaceutical industry?
 
In chapter 2, a review of the current studies and litera
 
ture will be presented and legislative proposals reviewed.
 
The purpose of this chapter is to familiarize the reader
 
with the topic of the thesis.
 
In chapter 3, the arguments of the advantages and dis
 
advantages of the proposed legislative reforms discussed in
 
chapter 2 will be presented.
 
Chapter 4 will provide a review of the research method
 
ic
 
TABLE 5
 
Nbw Dr"P!S Help RBduce The Gosl; Of Medical Trsa'tmeii't
 
vlHKouir Pto^' 
loo'fe 
v>i*Hr> fit3dK|\acAio 
^•^bvoHcs 
Treatment Cost 
of Urinary Tract 
Infection " 
loo'fo 
Treatment Cost 
of Ulcers 
MJrtH 
T».«MrteT 
1,1
 
ology employed in the study, pointing out the strengths
 
as well as the weaknesses. This chapter will be divided
 
into two major sections, research methods used in the survey
 
and in obtaining secondary sources,
 
A survey was conducted as part of the thesis to gather
 
some information from the point of view of the companies
 
that would be directly affected by the passage of the subject
 
legislative proposals. Chapter 5 will examine the responses
 
to this survey.
 
The final chapter will summarize the findings of the
 
study and make recommendations concerning passage of the
 
proposed legislation.
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Chapter Two
 
Review of Literature Search
 
and Legislative Proposals
 
There have heen several studies concerning the erosion
 
of the current patent law. These touch primarily on the issues
 
of distribution of returns to pharmaceutical R and D, break
 
even product lifetimes, declining patent life and shorter regu
 
latory approval times. In this chapter these studies will be
 
reviewed along with the proposed legislation that may affect
 
the current status of the patent law.
 
In order for the reader to understand the implications of
 
the passage of the target legislation of this research project,
 
the following is a summary of the legislative proposals. :(see
 
)
 
copj?" of the Patent Term Restoration Act of 1983 (H.R. 3502)
 
in appendix)
 
Patent Term Restoration Act (H.R. 3502)
 
The.jPatent Term Restoration Act was designed to extend the
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patent life of a product "by the amount of time equal to the
 
regulatory review period, up to a maximum of seven years. The
 
passage of this hill would essentially renew the seventeen year
 
exclusive marketing privlage of the innovative company.
 
Passed in the Senate, hut narrowly defeated in the House
 
in 1983, the contemplated legislation has heen reintroduced for
 
(Jongressional approval in 1984.15
 
Tax legislation
 
Economic issues are ohvious priority for Congress, and the
 
federal budget deficit means that legislators may he looking for
 
ways to raise revenues through nev/ or increased taxes. Efforts
 
to close the budget gap may mean legislative action that reduces
 
incentives for investments in R and D by U.S. industry. Until
 
the passage of the 1981 Tax Act, U.S. incentives for R and D
 
investments were less than those offered by most other industria
 
lized nations, such as Japan and countries in Western Europe. Be
 
fore that, U.S. companies- were increasing their R and D investments
 
1 fi

abroad at a faster rate than at home. There are two tax policies
 
affecting R and I) investments that the pharmaceutical industry feels
 
merit Congressional attention. Eirst, Gorigress could make perma^^
 
nent the two-year moratorium on the requirement in Regulation Sec
 
tion 1.861-8 of the Tax Code, that U.S. companies allocate a por
 
tion of U.S. R and D expenses to their foreign operations v/hen
 
calculating their overall foreign tax credit limitation. There
 
is evidence that this regulation has been a contributing factor
 
in persuading U.S. companies to make R and D investments overseas. '
 
Second, the 25 percent U.S. R and D tax credit passed in 1981
 
14
 
17 
has encouraged U.S. companies to make R and D investments at
 
home. This measure is scheduled to expire in 1985, unless Con
 
gress makes it a permanent part of the Tax Code.
 
Because U.S. research intensive industries have produced
 
such significant U.S. economic growth (one expert estimates that
 
R and D has produced 45 percent of U.S. economic growth since WV/II),
 
tax policies that discourage R and D investments could have a long­
18
 
term negative im.pact on U.S. economic recovery and growth.
 
Companies v/hich are committed to R and D for their future
 
growth Believe that U.S. policy should retain or improve exis
 
ting tax incentives for R and D investment in the U.S..
 
Hew Drug Approval Reforms
 
In addition to the patent term protection legislation to
 
increase the time for pharmaceutical companies to recoup invest
 
ments, one pharmaceutical company, with the support of. the phar
 
maceutical manufacturers Association, has suhmitted a proposal to
 
the FDA to reduce the complexity of the review process. The propo
 
sal would cut the review time in half for most chemical entities
 
without limiting sufficient safety and efficacy trials. The fol
 
lowing is an example of how the process currently works, comparing
 
two drugs of the same class approved in 1965 and ,1978.19 The
 
two drugs compared are in the class of Hbn-Steroidal Anti-Inflam
 
matory drugs. These drugs are primarily used for the treatment
 
of arthritis.
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Indocin Clinoril
 
1965 Introduced to the market 197S
 
1961 Development begun 1970
 
80 Scientific Personnel (years) 240
 
62 Clinical lestirig (personnel/months) -1409
 
10,900 EDA Submission to PDA 122,657 pages
 
pages
 
16^5 Effective Patent life 10.5 years
 
years
 
Source: The Merck Reviev;, Vol. 3, No. 2, January 1983
 
In response to recommendations for greater use of summaries,
 
which emphasize the main points of each stage of product development,
 
a Merck, Sharp and Dohme Pharmaceutical Company team of clinical
 
and regulatory specialists developed the "pyramid concept". The
 
pyramid structure meets the needs of the PDA and that of other
 
regulatory agencies outside the U.S.A.. Each agency can stop at
 
the level of the pjrcamid that satisfies its req_uirements.
 
In the pyramid summary the documentation for the clinical
 
section of the New Drug Application contains several levels of
 
detail:
 
At the top of the pyramid, at level one, is a one page sjrnop­
sis of the key ingredients of the study and their results, giving
 
an overview of the total clinical program and a feel for the new
 
drug's value.
 
Level two is a longer summary in medical .journal style.
 
Level three contains detailed analysis of the study's ma
 
terials and methods, results, discussions and conclusions, inclu-,
 
16
 
ding all statistical data.
 
Level four consists of Lack-up materials to level three,
 
such as documents, data listings and supportive information.
 
Level five, the ha,se of the pyramid, v^ould contain all of
 
the raw data. Levels four and five would not he needed hy the
 
PLii unless specific problems arose..
 
Secretary of Health Schweiker estimates that such a sumirary
 
approach could reduce the size of an riDA hy seventy percent.
 
It would also provide assurance that details were readily avail­
20
 
ahle in the Bvent of any questions.
 
The development of a drug and its suhsequent marketing can
 
he viewed as an investment project. One way of evaluating such
 
a projects performance is to calculate its internal rate of return,
 
which is a measure of each dollar invested. 'Technically, the in
 
ternal rate of return on a project is the discount rate that sets
 
the present value of money spent hy the firm equal to the present
 
value of money recieved hy the firm. The followirig are several
 
21
 
studies explaining these concepts further.
 
Distribution of Returns
 
The empirical work of Henry Grahov^ski and John Vernon,
 
Duke University, indicates the distribution of returns to
 
pharmaceutical R and D is highly skewed in character. In
 
their analysis of all U.S. discovered new drug introduc­
17
 
tions for the period of 1970 to 1976, they found only 13
 
of these.39 new drugs has ex post discounted revenues
 
greater than ex ante R and D costs (i.e. Sl profitability
 
22
 index greater than one). This means R and D is subject ,
 
to high levels of uncertainty and riskiness. Research
 
oriented.firms are heavily dependent on obtaining an oc
 
casional "big. winner" to cover their R and D costs and
 
generate a profitable return on their overall R and D
 
investment.
 
Breakeven Product Lifetimes ..
 
.Analysis of,breakeven product lifetimes indicates 
that it takes 19 years for the average new drug to cover 
R and D costs at a real interest rate of 10 percent. Al 
ternately, at■an interest rate of 8 percent for pharma 
ceutical firm R and D investment, the breakeven lifetime 
is 12 years. This range in breakeven product lifetimes 
can be compared to the avearge effective patent life for 
new drug introductions. Effective patent' terms average 
approximately 7 years over the 1979^' to 1981 period and 
' 24 
have been trending downward over time. 
In a study.by the University of Rochester Center for 
the. Study of Drug Development, the following analysis was 
done on patent terms versus breakeven lifetimes. In figure 
one, the v/eighted average profitability index for the 37 
drugs in the sample is shown as a function of expected 
commercial lifetime. This is.plotted for four different 
values for the real interest rate (or cost of capital) for 
18 
 FIGURE 1
 
ReiATiON or Weighted Average PRoriTADiiiTY Index toProduct Life at Various Interest Rates
 
(weights are R and D costs)

Profitability index
 
5% real interest rate
 
2.5
 
2.0
 
8% real interest rate
 
KD
 
1.5
 
iO% real interest rate
 
1.0
 
0.5
 15% real interest rate
 
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 (12) 13 14 15 16 17 18 (19) 20 21 22 23 24 25
 
Product life (years)
 
Noie: Assumptiiyns—(I) lhirly<scvcn NCEs discovered and introduced in the United States between 1970 and 1976; (2) Mansen's
 
R and D cost by therapeutic class; (3) ratio of production cost to sales = 0.30; (4) ratio of world net revenues to U.S. net
 
revenues == 1.75.
 
a. (Present value of net revenue8)/(present value of R and D cost).
 
R and D investments. The point at which each curve in
 
tersects the PI=1 line defines breakeven lifetimes. In
 
particular this figure indicates that tc achieve a real
 
return cn capital cf 10 percent, it takes 19 years cf
 
projected net revenues at current rates. On the ether
 
hand, if we assume the appropriate real cost cf capital
 
(inclusive cf risk premium) is 8 percent, then the pro
 
duct life necessary tc breakeven is 12 years. These es­
timtes assume as before that the fraction cf production
 
costs tc sales is equal tc .30 and the ratio cf v/crld net
 
25
 
revenues tc U.S. revenues is 1.75.
 
The required product life necessary for firms tc
 
earn back their R and D investments displayed in Figure
 
one can be usefully compared with the data cn effective
 
26
 
patent life. Table 6 shows the trend in average effec
 
tive patent lives cf new chemical entities over the period
 
1963 to 1981. As the IIID period and NDA approval times
 
have lengthened overtime, the average effective patent
 
life has correspondingly declined. Over the period of
 
1979 to 1981, average effective patent life v/as only 7.1
 
27
 
years.
 
As one can readily see from this comparative data,
 
average payback periods in the 1970's tended to exceed
 
by a substantial margin average expected patent lives.
 
The latter were in fact trending downv/ard, leading to an
 
increasing divergence over time.
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TABLE v6
 
Average Effective Compound Patent Life for New Chemical Entities
 
Introduced into the United States from 1963-1981
 
Average Effective
 
Patent Life
 
Year (years)
 
1963 17.4
 
1964 17.2
 
1965 15.7
 
1966 13.0 
1967 15.0 
1968 14.8 
1969 12.7 
1970 14.5 
1971 11.2 
1972 11.5 
1973 12.5 
1974 12.4 
1975 9.6 
1976 11.2 
1977 9.7 
1978 11.3 
1979 7.4 
1980 7.1
 
1981 6.8
 
NOTE; Effective patent life refers to the length of time from the date of FDA
 
approval until the date of patent expiration.
 
SOURCE: Computed by University of Rochester Center for the Study of Drug
 
Development.
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Of course, the extent to which' declining patent life
 
is a serious disincentive to innovation depends on how
 
much product competition and substitution actually de
 
velops in the period after the patent expires. The degree
 
of such competition in future periods can he expected to
 
increase significantly as a result of the nev/ product
 
selection laws,and other institutional shifts now taking
 
place. If substitution laws increase competition for the
 
innovator's product, then the degree of patent protection
 
will assume a more critical role in the profitability of
 
drug innovation, A shorter effective patent life brings
 
the impact of drug substitution forward in time, increasing
 
the impact of revenue losses on the expected return to
 
innovation.
 
In a sensitivity analysis of this issue, Henry G-ra­
bowski states, that patent life and substitution impact
 
on returns in a non-linnear fashion. If the patent life
 
actually equalled the legal life of 17 years, the effects
 
on expected returns of even very high rates of substitution
 
would be quite small (because they occur so far into the
 
future and are heavily discounted). On the other hand,
 
if the effective patent life is in the range of 5 to 8
 
years, the prospects of significant substitution rates
 
after patent expiration have a much greater negative
 
impact on expected returns,^®
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Th.e Interaction Between Substitution Rates and Patent Lifetimes
 
In a statistical analysis of the interaction between substi
 
tution ra.tes a,nd. patent lifetimes by the Health Care Financing
 
Adrainistration in V/ashington, D.C. and Allison Masson of the
 
Federal Irade Commission (FTC), the following analysis was made.
 
The sensitivity of the expected profitability of R and D
 
to joint changes in the effective patent life and the degree
 
of substitution using the profitability index (Pi) baseline
 
analysis was examined. For this analysis, the benchmark case,
 
a nroduct life of 20 years and a real interest rate of 10 percent,
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The PI corresponding to these assumptions is 1.029.
 
In order to study the sensitivity of this P.I. of 1.029
 
to changes in the effective patent life and the degree of
 
substitution, the researchers imposed selected values of these
 
parameters on their data and recalculated the Pis. The result
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of all the cases are given in table 7.
 
In this analysis, they considered effecti^we patent lives
 
of 5,8,12, and 17 years and losses in income due to product
 
substitution after patent expiration of 10, 30 and 50 percent.
 
As noted earlier, average effective patent life has been be
 
tween 5 and 8 years in recent years, but there is a large vari-­
ance across individual new chemical entities (PCS) introduc
 
tions. The assumed ravige on the product substitution para
 
meter is consistent with that observed in various studies.
 
For example, an FTC sponsored study found median substi
 
tution rates varied across states in a range of 5.2
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TABLE 7
 
Sensitivity Analysis Showing Profitability Index for
 
Alternative Assumptions About the Impact of
 
Substitution and the Effective Patent Life
 
Percentage Reduction Effective Patent Life 
US Net Income 
upon Patent Expiration 5 Years 8 Years 12 Years 17 Years 
-10 .982 .996 1.011 1.023
 
(-4.6) (-3.2) (-1.7) (-•6)
 
-30 .888 .930 .974 1.011
 
(-13.7) (-9.6) (-5.3) (-1.7)
 
-50 .749 .863 .937 .998
 
(-27.2) (-16.1) (-8.9) (-3.0)
 
NOTES: (1) The standard against which the above Profitability Indexes(PI's)
 
should be compared is 1.029. This is the PI for a 20-year commercial life
 
with no reduction in US net income. It is also assumed that the ratio of
 
production cost to sales is .3, the ratio of world net revenues to US net
 
revenues is 1.75, and the real interest rate is .10.
 
(2) It is assumed that at the end of the effective patent life,
 
substitution will result in the alternative reductions in US net income
 
given above for the remaining years of the 20-year commercial life.
 
(3) The numbers in parentheses are the percentage reductions for each
 
PI from the standard PI of 1.029.
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31
 to 45.9 percent.
 
As one would expect, the calculated Pis in table 11
 
are lower for shorter effective patent lives and for greater
 
percentage reductions due to substitution. Under the most
 
unfavorable conditions for R and D activity considered here,
 
a five year patent life and 50 percent redaction in U.S.
 
net income from substitution in the period after patent
 
expiration the rate of return is reduced to .749 or by
 
about 27 percent from the 1.029 benchmark, A 30 percent
 
net income reduction causes the PI to decline by 13 percent
 
for a five year effective patent life and by 10 percent
 
32
 
for an eight year life. These estimated effects are
 
significant and, holding other things constant, the com
 
bination of short patent lives and substantial levels of
 
product substitution may be expected to make several R
 
and D projects unprofitable to pharmaceutical manufacturers
 
that would be profitable under more favorable conditions
 
in these parameters.
 
The results in table 11 underscore the fact that the
 
effects of Substitution on R and D returns are highly sen
 
sitive to the length of patent protection,. If the patent
 
life for drugs actually equalled the legal life of 17 years,
 
the effects of increased substitution on R and D returns
 
would be quite modest, Por example, with a seventeen year
 
life, even a 50 percent reduction in the U,S, net income
 
from substitution causes R and D profitability to decrease
 
by only three percent in the present example. This reflects
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the fact that with a reasonably long patent life, the effects
 
of substitution are discounted substantially because they occur
 
well into the future, Howeirer, as patent lifes decrease, the
 
negative effects of drug substitution on expected returns are
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magnified in a non-linear lashion.
 
The decline in the effective patent period is significant,
 
hov^ever, only if the expiration of the drug patent opens the way
 
to considerable entry or price reduction, A study by the American
 
Enterprise Institute suggest that innovators of drugs are usually
 
successful in maintaining the market position of drugs long after
 
their patents expired, Ihe trademark law plays an important: role
 
in maintaining this market position, A trademark is defined as
 
"a name, sjrmbol, or other device identifying a product, officially
 
registered and legally restricted to the use of the owner or man
 
ufacturer,", For example, a manufacturer who wishes to market
 
an analgesic bearing the generic name acetaminophen may do so
 
as there is no patent in effect to prohibit it, A manufa.cturer
 
may market the drug under the generic name, or he may create a
 
name for it that can be registered as a trademark. He does not
 
have the option of naming it Tylenol, however, v/hich is a regi
 
stered trademark of acetaminophen made by McNeil, or any of the
 
other trademarks that are already registered:to other mianu­
facturers of acetaminophen. Unlike patents, which have a limited
 
time period during which they are in effect, trademarks can be 
received indefinitel.y as long as they are used in interstate 
34 ■ , 
commerce,
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The Effects of Shorter Re.gulatory Approval 'Times
 
A simulation exercise was done by the American Enterprise
 
Institute for Public Policy Reserach. This simulation concerned
 
the effect of shorter regulatory approval times on breakeven life^
 
times and the returns on R and P investments. Specifically they
 
analyzed hov; the breakeven curves in figure one y/ould be shifted
 
if regulatory approval were reduced from the two years or so it
 
now averages to lesser values (e.g. fg-, 1 and f- years). They
 
found that a 1-|- 3'ear reduction in the time it takes for a new
 
drug application to be approved -would reduce the time it takes
 
for a firm to recoup its R and D investments by a full five years
 
(from 19 to 14 yee.rs). This is shown on figure 2 where the
 
analysis focuses on the baseline case v;ith the cost of capital
 
assunied to be 10 percent. Similar findings occur v^hen other"
 
parameters are used in the model.35
 
These results underscore the disproportionate effect that
 
cha,nges in ?'up front" approval times can have on research in
 
centives. In effect, it takes more than three years of added
 
time on the end of a patent period to compensate for an ad-,
 
ditional one 3'"ear regulatory?" delay in gaining ifPA approval
 
(given the 10 percent real interest rate and other parameters
 
assumed above). This reflects the time value of money. A
 
dollar received in the future has a discounted present value
 
that is less than a dollar received today because the latter
 
C\
 
can earn interest at the firm's opportunity cost of capital.
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FIGURE 2
 
Relation of Weighted-Average Profitability Index to Product Life for Alternative
 
Profitability index® 	 New Drug Application ApprovalTimes
 
one and one-half years less
 
1.4	 y one year less
 
1.3	 \ y one-half year less
 \ \ \ no change in approval time
 
1.2
 
1.1
 
ro 1.0
 
00
 
c:
 
8	 9 10 11 12 13(14) 15 16 17 18 (19) 20 21 22 23 24
 
Product life(years)
 
Noie: Assumptions—(1) real interest rale = 10 percent; (2) ratio of production cost to sales = 0.30; (3) ratio of world net reve
 
nues to U.S. net revenues » 1.75;(4) thirty-seven NCEs discovered and introduced in the United Slates 1970-1976; (5) liansen's
 
R and D costs by therapeutic class
 
a. (Present value of net revenues)/(present value of R and D cost).
 
Public policy toward tbe drug industry should be formulated
 
in the context of a broader poliC3^ to improve the medical- care
 
system. Designers of public policy for the industry should
 
consider the fact that the industry has been society's princi
 
pal instrument for the discovery, and development of new drugs
 
in past decades. Most nev/ drugs originate in the pharmaceutical
 
industry, because the research directed towards the discovery of
 
new drugs is done almost entirely by the industry. Public policies
 
and regulations affecting industry R and D will also affect the
 
rate and volume of new drug discovery and development.
 
If the drug industry is to maintain or increase its invest
 
ment in R and D, the rate of return it expects from such invest
 
ment must at least equal that,attainable from alternative invest
 
ments, The minimum expected rate of return from investments in
 
other industries has been about 10 percent after taxes, but the
 
expected rate of return from investment in pharmaceutical R and D
 
is estimated at 3.5 percent. This expected rate of return repre­
sents a sharp decline from the levels of the 1970s.37 It there
 
fore seems likely that the low level of expected rate of return,
 
in the decline in that rate from the previous high level will
 
cause investment in pharmaceutical R and D to fall.
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Chapter Three
 
Advantages and Disadvantages of
 
Passage of the Patent Term Extension Legislation
 
The primary piece of legislation proposed to extend
 
the patent lives of newly discovered pharmaoeutioal products
 
is the Patent Term Restoration Act. This proposal, if passed,
 
would amend the patent law to restore the term of the patent
 
grant for the period of time that nonpatent regulatory re­
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quirements prevent the marketing of the patented product.
 
Criticism of the legislative proposals have come from two
 
primary groups. These are consumers and generic drug manu
 
facturers, Their arguments are similar.
 
Consumer Groups
 
Many consumer groups claim that extending the exclu
 
sive marketing time of newly patented drugs would cause a
 
delay in the time these new drugs can become available as
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generic drugs. These drugs are the patented drugs manu
 
factured hy a firm other than the one that originally held
 
the patent. Because these generic drug manufacturers are
 
unburdened hy trying to recoup R and D cost they are able
 
to manufacture the drugs and,market!them more cheaply.
 
Another argument by consumer groups is that the proposed
 
legislation would be a disadvantage to the elderly. The
 
argument is that since the elderly are per capita the largest
 
consumers of drug products they would therefore be affected
 
the most. They believe that the extension of an exclusive
 
marketing privlege would keep prices high and therefore
 
penalize them.
 
The proponents of the legislation argue that because the el­
dely are the largest consumers of the drug products, the
 
elderly are truly the greatest beneficiaries when more R and
 
I) is on-going. The proposed legislation would not affect
 
any drug product already on the market. But the innovation
 
it would stimulate will give the elderly access to life-

extending medicines that they might not otherwise receive.
 
It might spare them hospital or convalescent maintenance.
 
And it could provide these benefits at a net cost savings
 
because new drugs will provide downward pressure on the
 
prices of older drugs,
 
Moreover, because this legislation might accelerate
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the rate of innovation, new drugs could hecome older drugs
 
earlier, advancing pharmaceutical science farther and farther
 
heyond where it would have been without this legislation.
 
In time, new drugs, even with restored patent life, will
 
go off patent and he subject to generic competition sooner
 
than would be the case had innovation been allowed to con­
tinue at its present retarded pace.''
 
Generic Drug Manufacturers
 
The other major group that is not very happy with the
 
extension of the patent lives of new drugs through proposed
 
legislation is of course, the generic drug companies. These
 
companies, whose business is cheaply marketing drugs invented
 
by others, warn that patent term restoration will increase
 
the price of medicines and will diminish the vitality of
 
4.2

the generic drug industry.^
 
On the first issue of increasing prices of medicines,
 
the proponents of the legislation say they are missing the
 
point. They claim that the purpose of patents are to give
 
inventors a reward for their inventiveness. Innovation
 
has a cost, and if society is not prepared to pay it,
 
few new drugs will be discovered. The patent restoration
 
legislation would not apply to any already patented drugs
 
on the market or in the regulation pipeline. It would
 
not take effect until the year 2000. So even if the in
 
novative drug companies merely wanted to increase profits,
 
the only way they could do that under the proposed legis­
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lation is by stepping up research on drugs that will be ■ 
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ready to market about the turn of the century.
 
These proponents further state that as long as the PDA
 
approval process cuts into the effective life of pharmaceu
 
tical patents, drug companies in the United States will be
 
at a disadvantage to foreign competitors and other sectors
 
of the economy in patbnt protection and product innovation.
 
That hardly seems desirable or fair.
 
The second complaint from the opponents of the legis
 
lation charging that the extension of patent life will di
 
minish the vitality of the generic drug industry is answered
 
by the following argument of the supporters of the legislation.
 
To begin with, generic firms are healthy and growing rapidly.
 
Because of present patent limitations many products patents
 
are expiring each year, in many cases after only very limi
 
ted exclusive marketing by the companies responsible for
 
the original R and D of these drugs. During the past five
 
years, sales of publicly held generic companies have more
 
than doubled, while profits have more than tripled. Both
 
growth rates are well above comparable rates for research
 
based firms, (see tables 8 and 9 ) Moreover, it is esti
 
mated that by 1985, nearly 50 drugs whose sales in 1980
 
were upward of $1.2 billion will come off patent. By 1988,
 
products with sales estimated around $2.8 billion will no
 
longer be protected by patents. This means that even
 
the patent restoration legislation is enacted, the market
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TABLE B
 
PROFITS OF GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES
 
(S Thousands)
 
COMPANY 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 <^0 CHANGE 
Bolar Pharm. 
Lanneii Co. 
K. V. Pharm. 
MyIan Labs 
Reid-Provideni 
Forest Labs. 
Faraday 
Guardian Chem. 
Zenith Labs. 
S 253.4 
83.3 
201.0 
(1,162.0) 
301.0 
983.2 
135.3 
2.3 
(1,793.0) 
S 717.0 
75.2 
588.2 
1,086.0 
276.0 
664.9 
110.9 
(49.0) 
(652.0) 
S 1,227.0 
101.7 
348.4 
1,152.0 
209.0 
68.3 
139.4 
23.2 
(465.0) 
S 1,659.9 
127.1 
(355.5) 
1,805.0 
139.0 
(600.5) 
159.4 
(14.6) 
20.0 
S 2,139.9 
135.0 
264.7 
1,454.0 
263.0 
1,524.2 
506.3 
60.1 
166.0 
S 2,708.7 
159.7 
352.2 
631.0 
405.0 
2,147.0 
854.3 
Not Avail. 
2,470.0 
968.9 <^0 (76-'81) 
91.7 <70 C76.'81) 
75.2 (76-^81) 
41.9 C77-»81) 
34.6 7o (76-'81) 
118.4 »/o (76-'81) 
531.4 <70 (76-'8r) 
2,513.0 <7o (76-'80) 
12,250.0 <70 (79-'81) 
Total S (<»95.7) S 2,817.2 S 2,804.0 s 2,939.8 S 6,513.2 $ 9,727.9 239.4 % (77-'81, 
excl. Guardian) 
131.2 % r77-m
 
ind. Guardian)
 
Source: U.S. Drugstore and Hospital Audits, IMS America, Ltd.
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TABLB 9
 
Pharmaceatical Sales Por 27 GEHERIC Pharmaceutical Companies
 
$ Sales % Change % Change 
Year (000) Yearly 1978-1982 
1978 I 41,801 
1979 50,836 21.69^0 
1980 67,894 35.6% 
1981 80,725 18.8% 
1982 115,005 42.5% 175.1% 
SOURCE: U.S. Urugstore and Hospital Audits, IMS America, Ltd.
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potential for generics will be more than doubled in the
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next five years.
 
Both supporters and opponents of a Patent Term Restoration
 
Act have convincing arguments. An analysis of the information
 
presented in this chapter could influence one to select ei
 
ther side with good cause. Until the legislation is passed
 
and enacted or time passes with no changes in the current
 
laws, we will not know.which choice was the best one. The
 
answer will take several decades to present itself. This
 
researcher hopes that Congress will take the facts and make
 
the most intelligent decision and pray it's the right one.
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Ohapter Four
 
Research Methodology
 
To examine the research methodology employed in this ■ ■ 
project, this chapter will be divided into two sections. 
The:first section will examine the methods used in conducting 
the survey employed as part of this research project and 
the second section will examine the methods used in collect 
ting iriformation from secondary sources (i.e. periodicals, 
journals, newspapers, etc.). 
Survey .
 
Scope of Research
 
To evaluate these questions from the point of view of
 
the.industry practitioners, a survey was sent to 100 of the
 
111 pharmaceutical companies in the United States that
 
manufacture products for humans. The survey was administered
 
in the form of a standardized questioTiaire sent out by mail.
 
The questionaire used in the survey may be found in the appendix.
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The strength and validity of any mail survey relies
 
on an adequate response rate. The following steps v^ere
 
taken in order to solicit the best possible response rate:
 
(1) 	a standardized q_uestionaire was prepared and pretested
 
on pharmaceutical representatives in the Riverside County
 
area, with favorable results; (2) the standardized ques­
tionaire was mailed to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
 
in each of the 100 companies surveyed; (3) the 100 companies
 
were chosen using a standardized random number chart; (4) in
 
order to assure anonymity of responses, all surveys were
 
mailed with self-addressed stamped envelopes for return of
 
the surveys; (5) follow-up cards were sent out to all compa
 
nies after 60 days and a response rate of only 5'1 percent.
 
These steps provided a response rate of 74 percent with 74
 
out of loo surveys returned.
 
limitations
 
All studies must operate within certain limitations
 
and this study was no exception. Limitations imposed upon
 
this study were: restricted response rate, restricted funds,
 
the problem of external validity, question clarity and data
 
clarity.
 
Restricted Response Rate
 
With any survey that does not receive a 100 percent
 
response rate, there is the possible problem that the study
 
may not be considered valid. If the response rate is too
 
low the survey may not accurately represent the area of
 
study. For this particular study, the survey response rate
 
was 74 percent. 	 i
 
Restricted Funds
 
ilie lack of a large budget to work v/ith for this' study
 
restricted the quality of the study. If more fundiiag were
 
available, a telephone survey would have been preferrable.
 
However, because the pharmaceutical industry seems to be
 
primarily based in the Eastern States, this would have gone
 
far beyond the budget with which this researcher had to •work,
 
A telephone study could have solicited bias, explana
 
tions for answers and comments on proposed legislation,
 
through the eyes of the experienced observer (like a CEO),
 
could have been solicited and analysed in addition to the stan
 
dard responses given in a mailed questionaire. Also, a
 
telephone survey would most probably have increased the
 
rate of response.
 
lack of funds also restricted the study to those in
 
the manufacturing area of the pharmaceutical industry. A
 
survey of pharmacists, physicians and regulatory bureaucrats
 
in the PDA and patent offices may have added several dif
 
ferent points of view concernirig the subject of this study.
 
Problem of External Validity
 
Since the survey was conducted in only the pharmaceutical
 
industry, a limitation is that of external validity. The
 
results can only reflect the views of the pharmaceutical
 
industry concerning the proposed legisla,tion.
 
On the positive side, the study was administered to
 
ICQ of the 111 companies that manufacture drugs in the united
 
States. She results should be a fairly accurate description
 
of their perceptions of hov/ various governmenta.1 regulations ­
have and would affect their business practices.
 
Question Clarity
 
The survey was administered to the Chief Executive
 
Officers of each pharmaceutical company and operated under
 
certain assumptions. It was assumed that the OSO could ac
 
curately an'iswer the questions concerning increased spending
 
on R and D if specific legislation were passed and that he
 
would answer accurately. It was also assumed that "increased
 
spending" meant that the company is currently allocatirjg
 
funds for R and D,
 
Data Clarity
 
This study is based on many subjective responses from
 
the CEOs or whomever they designated to answer the question­
aire. In addition, the answers to the questions are percep
 
tions of the respondants; they can only be verified if or v;hen
 
questionable legialation has passed. Although precautions
 
v^ere taken to eliminate possible bias, this study, like
 
m.ast studies cannot ensure that all bias is eliminated.
 
It is assumed that all respondants answered all questions
 
based on empirical data that their companies have compiled, .
 
Secondary Sources
 
Scope of Research
 
To evaluate the potential relationship between patents,
 
product substitution and regulatory policies and United States
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R and D in the pharmaceutical industry, a. literature search,
 
v;as conducted using every avadlahle source that v/a.s avail­
ahle to the researcher, these included journal articles from
 
economic, husiness, medical arnd pharmaceutical periodicals,
 
newspapers (i.e. V/all Street Journal, Barrens, l.A. Times,
 
ti.Y. Times), Congressional Testimony transcripts, copies of
 
legislative proposals and text written by practitioners in
 
the area of pharmaceutical development.
 
Validity and limitations
 
The validity of all secondary sources must be throughly
 
scrutinized. If possible the researcher must determine the
 
motivatiori behind every published word. V/as it strictly
 
informational or are there hidden biases. Many include sta
 
tistics and the researcher must determine if they are not only
 
complete, but relevant to the argument they are supporting.
 
Was funding for the research provided by a company that would
 
benefit from certain conclusions on the research? All these
 
things were considered when selecting the information to be
 
used in this research project. Because of funding, geographic
 
and access limitations it v-;as not always possible to get the
 
iiiformation needed to adeque.tely ansv/er all these questions,
 
but they were all considered with all information reviewed
 
for inclusion in this study.
 
bummary
 
This chapter was designed to operationally define the
 
objectives of the study and to explain the approaches taken
 
to realize them. The chapter explained the process of research
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as v/ell as tlie precautions that were employed in order to gain
 
unbiased and accurate data about regulatory impact upon
 
R and 1 in the pliarimceutical industry. Ihe next chapter will
 
discuss the results of the survey.
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Chapter Five
 
Responses to the Survey
 
The following is a summary of the survey responses.
 
Survey Response Rate
 
The results of this survey are based upon the responses
 
of 74 out of the 100 pharmaceutical companies that were
 
solicited for responses. V/hen determining the sample size,
 
this researcher determined that 100 companies would be an ade
 
quate sample of the entire population of 111 companies that
 
manufacture pharmaceuticals for humans in the United States.
 
These companies were taken from the manufacturers index in
 
the Physician's Desk Reference and chosen randomly using a
 
standardized random number chart. This sample of 100 would
 
also- provide the researcher with a simple number from which
 
to calculate percentages and for the reader to evaluate the
 
significance of the numbers. It was also determined that
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JABIE a-Q
 
Survey Response Rate By Gonnjany's Average Annual Income
 
(In Dollars) 

Average Annual Income 

less than 100,000 

100-500,000 

500,000-1 million 

1-10 million 

10-25 million 

25-50 million 

50-100 million 

over 100 million 

TOTAL 

Humber of
 
Responses
 
0
 
8
 
1
 
21
 
9­
5
 
6
 
24
 
74
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 TABLE 11
 
Percentage Of Sales Allocated For Research. And Development
 
Ooinpanies # of 
Annual Income Companies 1-2 3-5 6-8 8-10 10 or more 
100-500,000 4 3 1 0 0 0 
500,000-1 mil. 1 ' 0 1 0 0 0 
1-10 million 16 1 7 6 2 0 
10-25 million 7 0 3 2 1 1 
25-50 million 5 0 2 2 1 0 
50-100 million 6 0 0 4 1 1 
over 100 million 23 0 0 6 7 10 
Totals 62 4 14 20 12 12 
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"by using the entire population of 111 the competence ratio
 
of the survey would not have increased significantly. T'ahle
 
10 shows the response rates for the study categorized by
 
average annual income for each company.
 
Research and Develonment Expenditures
 
In constructing the survey questions related to R and
 
R, the researcher's intentions v/ere to establish if the
 
com.panie3 were currently alloca,tirjg funding for R and D and
 
if so, the percentage of sales allocated and vjha.t the comr­
pany perceived to be the amount of time it takes to recoup
 
their R and D investments.
 
In their responses to the questions, of the 74 com
 
panies that responded 62 or 83.8 percent allocated a per
 
centage of their armual income to R and D. Table 11 shows
 
the percentage of the sales allocated by each company's
 
dollar sales. These -results indicate that presently orily
 
the larger companies can afford to develop drugs that take
 
years of research and development, which ties up their
 
dollars that could be invested elsevi/here.
 
Based of the responses regarding the average number
 
of years it takes a firm to get a return on their R and D
 
investments for a new drug, the legislative reform propo
 
sals come as no surprise. Of the 62 companies tha.tt indi­
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 cated tliey funded R and D, 18 or 29 percent indicated that
 
it takes from 1-3 years to hegin to recoup their invest
 
ments, while 52 cr;:-51.6 percent indicated it takes from
 
6-9 years and another 12 or 19.4 percent indicated it
 
takes 10 or more years on the average, (see tahle 12)
 
As indicated in the introduction, the average patent
 
life left on a drug once it has been approved for marketing
 
hy the FDA is 6.8 years. More than 50 percent of the survey
 
respondents that invest sales dollars in R and D indicated
 
it takes an average of nine years to recoup their R and D
 
investments. If this is in fact the case, it appears
 
to be a clear indication of a disincentive in allocating
 
funds for R and D, As pointed out on several products in
 
table 3, patent:r.itime can expire on a given product even
 
before it is released to market, this allows other companies
 
to market it before the inventing company has had a chance
 
to recoup the initial R and D investment. This again is
 
an example of disincentives in investing money in R and D
 
when profit is the goal of the manufacturer,
 
Kew Product Releases (U,S, versus Foreign)
 
According to the data provided by the responding
 
companies, only 68 percent or 50 of the 74 responding com
 
panies manufacture and/or market drugs in countries outside
 
the United States, Of these companies table 13 provides
 
an analysis of the average patent lives left on a product
 
comparing their U.S. releases with,their foreign releases.
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 Table 12 
Average 
Time For Return On Research 
And Development Investments 
(in years) 
n= 62 
Return Time # of Respondents % of respondents 
1 to 3 years 18 29 
6 to 9 years 32 51.6 
10+ years 12 19.4 
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 Table 13
 
United States Versus Foreign Markets
 
Average Patent Lives of Drugs After Market
 
Releases
 
totals
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
 
8 50
# of responses 15 15 8 4
 
% of responses 30 30 16 16 8 100
 
# of years 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 totals 
FOREIGN # of responses 
COUNTRIES % of responses 12 
0 4 14 
0 8 28 
5 
10 
5 
10 
12 
24 
4 
8 
50 
100 
•^note- number of years represents the patent time remain
 
ing on a given product after market release.
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The following is an analysis of these responses. The
 
respondents indicated that when marketing Drug X in the U.S. •
 
76 percent of the drugs marketed in the U.S. have 9 years
 
or less of their patent lives remaining when they reach the
 
public. V/hile in most foreign countries new paiient laws have
 
restored patent time lost during research and development.
 
In foreign countries where the regulatory processes
 
for NBA approval are less timely, these same drugs average
 
3 to 7 more years of exclusive marketing to the innovative
 
company that developed the drug. This again shows disin
 
centives to U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturers to be innova
 
tive and develop new products for marketing in this countfy
 
and more of an incentive to concentrate efforts on develop
 
ing an export market. Many companies are spending dollars
 
to acquire controlling shares in small foreign pharmaceu
 
tical companies so that they can have products manufactured
 
in countries that they would ordinarily export drugs to.
 
This move would translate into great savings on transporta
 
tion and labor costs for the pharmaceutical companies, but
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perhaps for the United States it may mean the loss of jobs.
 
Legislative Supcort and the Degree of the Companies Politi
 
cal Involvement
 
In this section the responses related to specific
 
legislative reform will be evaluated. The main focus of
 
this thesis is a Patent Term Restoration Bill. Two other
 
areas will be evaluated to provide a-more general picture
 
of the pharmaceutical firms political involvement in issues
 
that directly affect their industry. The survey asked
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questions related to the Patent Term Restoration of 1983,
 
the Orphan Drug Bill (which was approved in 1983), tax in
 
centive legislation for manufacturers,in Puerto Rico and
 
the degree of company involvement in the decision making
 
process through the employment of lobbyists at the state
 
and federal government. Only the results of the responses
 
related to the first two topics will be discussed here.
 
Of the 74 respondents, 55 or 74.3 percent indicated
 
that their companies supported the Patent Term Restoration
 
Act of 1983. 48 or 66 percent indicated that their compa
 
nies would more than likely increase R and D expenditures
 
if the bill were passed.
 
These responses appear to indicate that the extension
 
of patent term for up to 7 years of the R and D time would
 
provide incentive to over 50 percent of the pharmaceutical
 
companies that responded or 48 percent of all 111 to increase
 
their R and D expenditures.
 
The, question related to the Orphan Drug Bill had the
 
most uniform responses of any of the survey questions. All
 
74 companies indicated that they supported the bill. Al
 
though they all supported the bill, only 20.2 percent or
 
15 companies are currently manufacturing and/or doing re
 
search on a chemical entity that would fall into this class,
 
A point worth noting is that all 15 companies fall into
 
the category of annual sales greater than $100.'million.
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Generic Drugs: ,
 
Generic drug manufacturers are one of the most vocal
 
groups opposing the major statute discussed in this research
 
project, that is the Patent Term Restoration Act of 1985.
 
They argue that if the hill is passed, they will he driven
 
out of business. In the survey three specific questions
 
were asked in relationship to generic drugs. These ques
 
tions were: (1) Does your company manufacture generic drugs?;
 
(2) Are the generic drugs you manufacture the result of a
 
patent once held hy your company?; and (3) What percentage
 
of your companies annual sales are from generic drugs?
 
The results indicated that 28 or 38 percent of the
 
companies manufactured generic drugs. Of these 28 companies
 
only 6 or 21 percent are manufacturing drugs that they once
 
held patents for. And finally of the 28 companies, 10 or
 
68 percent do nothing hut manufacture generic products that
 
they have not had to invest any funds into for R and D.
 
As might he expected, these same 10 companies indicated
 
that they did not support the Patent Term Restoration Act
 
of 1983 and will not support any future act of its kind.
 
However, these same companies were in favor of the PDA
 
shortening its regulatory review process.
 
With these results, one can conclude that the com
 
panies which manufacture only generic products feel they
 
will he the hardest hit hy the passage of the act. Be
 
cause of these perceptions they are, along with various
 
citizens groups, the most,staunch opponents to this hill.
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^ummary
 
The results of the survey of the pharmaceutical companies
 
may he summarized as follows:
 
A) The study is based upon the responses of 74 companies
 
representing 66.6 percent of the 111 total U.S. firms that
 
manufacture and market products for humans or 74 percent
 
of the 100 survey companies,
 
B) The surveys were addressed to the CEOs of each company.
 
The researchers reasoning was that this person should be
 
the most knowledgable in all aspects of the g.uestionaire
 
or have access to the information,
 
C) The responses indicateja consensus among the drug com
 
panies for the need of reforms in the areas of regulatory
 
review of new drug applications and tax incentives for R and D,
 
D) The responses indicate a clear relationship between
 
support and non-support of the patent term restoration legis
 
lation and the level to which the company produces generic
 
products. The companies that manufacture only generic drugs
 
and do no R and D are against the passage of any bill such as
 
the Patent Term Restoration Act of 1983, While the compa
 
nies that do R and D and are losing profit years because of
 
long regulatory approval times are firmly in support of
 
such a bill,
 
E) The responses indicate a relationship between patent,
 
product substituion and regulatory policies within the phar
 
maceutical industry and that they do have an effect on R and D.
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Uiapter Six
 
Summary and Recommendations
 
The primary goal of this research project was to
 
investigate the relationship hetv/een patent, product
 
substitution and regulatory policies. The main statutues
 
considered in this research were the Patent Term Restoration
 
Act of 1983 v/hich failed to pass in the Senate in November
 
1983 and has currently been reintroduced to Congress, New
 
Prug Applications Reform Bill and legislation targeted to
 
wards R and D tax incentives.
 
It v^as the intention of the researcher to establish
 
whether or not the pa.ssage of these statutes and others
 
like them v^ould increase R and D in research-based firm.s
 
or provide the incentives to keep R and D at the present
 
levels,
 
The review of all the previous literature on the
 
subject indicated that heavy opposition by pharmaceutical
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industry critics lessens the potential for life saving
 
drugs to be discovered and marketed. Statistical ana­
l3'sis from the policy standpoint emphasizes the im^Dortant
 
effects on research incentives that recent administrative
 
regulatory policies can have if they are successful in
 
reducing review time and clinical testing for new drug
 
introductions.
 
Survey results emphasize several points.
 
(1) v/hile passage of the Patent Term Restoration Act of
 
1983 may not increase R and D investments it could pre
 
clude the possibility of reductions in R and D expendi
 
tures. Several major research-based firms have either
 
cut back R and D investments, merged (i.e. Ciba-Giegy,
 
lily-Dista), or reduced R and D committment altogether
 
(i.e. Richardson-Vick which sold their R and D based di
 
vision).
 
(2) There was a direct correlation between the companies
 
that only manufactured generic drugs and their opposition
 
to the Patent Term Restoration Act. These same companies
 
indicated that they did support measures to give tax
 
incentives to R and I) based firms and reduce regulatory
 
review on new drug applications.
 
(3) The survey responses, pointed out another problem in
 
our regulation.of the pharmaceutical company in the U.S.
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versus other countries. The results indicated that be
 
cause of the shorter regulatory review policies in other
 
countries, life saving and extending drugs may be market
 
ed in other countries years before they reach the U.S.
 
market. The reasoning as indicated in the sum/'ey and
 
the literature search was because of U.S. regulatory re
 
view standards.
 
As a result of the research included in the paper,
 
the following recommendations are made in relationship
 
to patents, product substitution and regulatory policies
 
in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry:
 
(1) Passage of the Patent Term Restoration Act of 1983.
 
This would continue to give incentive to research-based
 
firms to continue R and D at present levels.
 
(2) Passage of the New Drug Approval Reforms Bill. This
 
shortening of the regulatory review process would guarantee
 
pharmaceutical companies more time to recoup R and D in
 
vestments.
 
(3) Allow for special tax incentive programs to firms
 
that invest 10 percent or more of their annual sales in
 
R and D. This would again establish more incentives for
 
pharmaceutical companies to continue R and D and find those
 
"magic■bullets" to cure and treat some of our most deva 
stating diseases. 
(4) Renew the 25 percent R and D tax credit that encourages 
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U.S. compariies to make R and D investments at home. Upon
 
renev/al, it is also recommended that it he ma.de a perma
 
nent part 0.1 the lax Code, These recommendations should
 
he instituted in stages to see if they v-;ill in fact produce
 
the intended results, v/hich are to maintain or increase
 
present levels of R and D in the pharmaceutical industry.
 
This should provide the market with a continuous flow of
 
new life-saving and extending drugs.
 
Stage one would make the 25 percent tax credit a perm
 
anent part of the Tax Code, Since this is due to expire soon
 
(1985) it should he instituted as soon as possible to con
 
tinue the already present incentives to IJ,S, companies to
 
make R and I) investments at home.
 
Stage two would he the passage of a New Drug Approval
 
Reforms Bill. If the review time is shortened, without
 
interfering with the quality and adequateness of the drug
 
review, then the exclusive marketing time should be extended
 
on most drugs. This should provide research-based firms more
 
time to recoup their R and D investments,and provide incen
 
tives to maintain R and D at present levels or increase it.
 
Stage three should be instituted simaltaneously with
 
stage two. This stage is to pass legislation allowing ta-x
 
incentives to firms that invest more than 10 percent of their
 
annual sales in R and D, v/ith the proyjosed shortening of
 
regulatory review times, an additional tax break for 10 per
 
cent or more of sales invested in R and D, which based on sur­
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vey results is about a.Yerage for the larger research based firms,
 
should a.ssure the minimum of present levels of R and D invest
 
ments here in the United States,
 
finally stage four should be initiated only if the intended
 
results are achieved from the enactment of stages 1 thru 3.
 
If after providing the incentives in stages 1 thru 3, the re>^'
 
search-based compa,nie3 do not step up R and D' and just enjoy
 
the increased profits, there is no reason to rev/ard them v;ith
 
a Patent Term Restoration Bill, which v;ill extend their ex
 
clusive marketing privlage up to 7 years, translating into
 
increased profits from a discovered chemical entity. As pro
 
posed in the 1983 version of the bill, it should not take affect
 
until the year 2000 and only on patents obtained on chemical,
 
entities that year and beyond, not for drugs already in the
 
approval pipeline. If the research-based firms perform ade
 
quately in stages 1 thru 3 then this bill should be passed
 
and instituted in the yea.T 2000 to give Congress an adequate
 
amount of time to evaluate the progress of stages 1 thru 3.
 
If these recommendations are instituted and evaluated
 
in the proposed stages, they would more than likely improve
 
R and D in the U.3, pharmaceutical industry and the more
 
drugs relea.sed on the market should make a.11 interested par
 
ties happy. The research-based firms will have time to re
 
coup) their initial investments in E. and D and receive a pro
 
fit from their efforts. The generic drug manufacturers will
 
over time end up with m.ore druss on the market as research
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continues and patents expire. And most importantly, the
 
public will have at their disposal the most technologically
 
advanced life saving and extending drugs.
 
T'he decliniRg rate of return on drug innovation does
 
not necessarily mean that the industry is declining. Many
 
diseases still av;ait a cure, and new research avenues, such
 
as genetic engineering, show promise, A steady stream of
 
important new drugs continues to flow, and we may still wit
 
ness significant breakthroughs and flurries of drug innovation
 
exceeding those of the past.
 
It is not likely, however, that we will see the industry
 
wide average returns on drug innovation that are double the
 
cost of capital, as was the case in the 1950's and 1960's,
 
The pharmaceutical industry today is mature. Many well es
 
tablished pharmaceutical companies exist with expertise in
 
drug innovation. Companies that find new and profitable re
 
search avenues v;ill find that other companies are quite '
 
capable of taking those same avenues. The resulting compe
 
tition is likely to keep returns on drug innovations close
 
to the cost of capital. The proposed legislative reforms
 
will perhaps serve to maintain the returns at this level
 
and not cause further disincentives to these innovative com
 
panies.
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COWpf/^ic^TS eg
 
t SW/Uf?.
 
98th congress
 
1st Session
 H.R.3502
 
To amend the patent law to restore the term of the patent grant for the period of
 
time that nonpatent regulatory requirements prevent the marketing of a
 
patented product.
 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 
June 30, 1983
 
Mr. Synab (for himself, Mr. Weight, Mr. Foley, Mr. Alexandee, Mr.
 
Michel, Mr. Lott, Mr. Beooks, Mr. Mazzoli, Mr. Sam B. Hall Je.,
 
Mr. Smith of Florida, Mr. Fish, Mr. MoOehead, Mr. Hyde, Mr. Kind
 
ness, Mr. Sawyee, Mr. Sensenbbennee, Mr. DeWine, Mr. Jones of
 
Oklahoma, Mr. Boland, Mr. Fuqua, Mr. Montgomeey, Mr. Coelho, Mr.
 
CoNABLE, Mr. Jenkins, Mr. Rose, Mr. Shelby, Mr. Feost, Mr. Whit­
ley, Mr. Daschle, Mr. Anthony, Mr. Hefnbe, Mr. Dwyee of New
 
Jersey, Mrs. Byeon, Mr. Ieeland, Mr. Shaep, Mr. Dowdy of Mississippi,
 
Mr. Luken, Mr. Tallon,Mr. Skelton, Mr. Valentine, Mr. Ackeeman,
 
Mr. VoLKMBE, Mr. Beeaux, Mr. Beitt, Mr. Jacobs, Mr. Muephy, Mr.
 
ScHEiJEE, Mr. Hubbaed, Mr. Walgeen, Mr. Kostmayee, Mr. Foed of
 
Tennessee, Mr. Stenholm, Mr. Bonee of Tennessee, Mr. Hutto, Mrs.
 
Lloyd, Mr. Floeio, Mr. McCxjedy, Mr. English, Mr. Watkins, Mrs.
 
Hall of Indiana, Mr. Towns, Mr. Deeeick, Mr. Caepee, Mr. Haeeison,
 
Mr. Nichols, Mr. Flippo, Mr. Speatt, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Tauzin, Mr.
 
Andeews of Texas, Mr. Gejdenson, Mr. Madigan, Mr. Rittee, Mr.
 
Fobsythe, Mr. Chappie, Mr. Couetee, Mr. Smith of New Jersey, Mr.
 
Hilee, Mr. Geamm, Mr. Daub, Mr. Whittakee, Mrs. Roukema, Mr.
 
Bliley, Mr.Edwaeds of Alabama, Mr. Bueton of Indiana, Mr. Solomon,
 
Mr. PoETEE, Mr. Thomas of California, Mr. O'Beien, Mr. Geegg, Mr.
 
CouGHLiN, Mr. OxLEY, Mr. Webee, Mr. Pashayan, Mr. Coats, Mr.
 
COECOEAN, Mr. WoETLEY,Mr. McKiNNEY, Mr. Lowbey of California, and
 
Mr. Petei)introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Commit
 
tee on the Judiciary
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A BILL
 
To amend the patent law to restore the term of the patent grant
 
for the period of time that nonpatent regulatory require
 
ments prevent the marketing of a patented product.
 
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa­
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
 
3 That this Act may be cited as the "Patent Term Restoration
 
4 Act of 1983".
 
5 Sec. 2.(a)Title 35 of the United States Code is amend­
6 ed by adding the following new section immediately after sec­
7 tion 154:
 
8 "§155.Restoration of patent term
 
9 "(a)(1)Except as provided in paragraphs(3)and(4), the
 
10 term of a patent which encompasses within its scope a prod­
11 uct subject to regulatory review, or a method for using such a
 
12 product or a method for producing such a product, shall be
 
13 extended from the original expiration date of the patent by
 
14 the amount of time equal to the regulatory review period if—
 
15 "(A) the owner of record of the patent gives
 
16 notice to the Commissioner in compliance with the pro­
17 visions of subsection (b)(1);
 
18 "(B) the product has been subjected to regulatory
 
19 review pursuant to statute before its commercial mar­
20 keting or use; and
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1 "(C) the patent to be extended has not expired
 
2 prior to notice to the Commissioner under subsection
 
3 (h)(1).
 
4 "(2) The rights derived from any claim of any patent
 
5 extended under paragraph(1)shall be limited-—
 
6 "(A) in the case of any patent, to the scope of
 
7 such claim which relates to the product subject to reg­
8 ulatory review, and
 
9 "(B) in the case of a patent which encompasses
 
10 within its scope a product—
 
11 "(i) which is subject to regulatory review
 
12 under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
 
13 to the uses of the product which may be regulated
 
14 by the chapter of such Act under which the regu­
15 latory review occurred, or
 
16 "(ii) which is subject to regulatory review
 
17 under any other statute, to the uses of the product
 
18 which may be regulated by the statute under
 
19 which the regulatory review occurred.
 
20 "(3) In no event shall the term of any patent be ex­
21 tended for more than seven years or shall more than one
 
22 patent be extended for the same regulatory review period for
 
23 the product.
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1 "(4)The term of a patent which encompasses within its
 
2 scope a method for producing a product may not be extended
 
3 under this section if—
 
4 "(A) the 0"wner of record of such patent is also
 
5 the owner of record of another patent which encom­
6 passes within its scope the same product; and
 
7 "(B) such patent on such product has been ex­
8 tended under this section.
 
9 "(b)(1) To obtain an extension of the term of a patent
 
10 under subsection (a), the owner of record of the patent shall
 
11 notify the Commissioner under oath, within ninety days after
 
12 the termination of the regulatory review period for the prod­
13 uct to which the patent relates, that the regulatory review
 
14 period has ended. Such notification shall be in writing and
 
15 shall—
 
16 "(A)identify the Federal statute under which reg­
17 ulatory review occurred or, if the regulator review oc­
18 curred under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
 
19 Act, the chapter of the Act under which the review oc­
20 curred;
 
21 "(B) state the dates on which the regulatory
 
22 review period commenced and ended;
 
23 "(C) identify the product for which regulatory
 
24 review was required;
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1 "(D) state that the requirements of the statute
 
2 under which the regulatory review referred to in sub­
3 section (a)(1)(B) occurred have been satisfied and com­
4 mercial marketing or use of the product is not prohihit­
5 ed; and
 
6 "(E) identify the patent and any claim thereof to
 
7 which the extension is applicable and the length of
 
8 time of the regulatory review period for which the
 
9 term of such patent is to be extended and state that no
 
10 other patent has been extended for the regulatory
 
11 review period for the product.
 
12 "(2) Upon receipt of the notice required by paragraph
 
13 (1), the Commissioner shall promptly publish in the Official
 
14 Gazette of the Patent and Trademark Office the information
 
15 contained in such notice. Unless the requirements of this sec­
16 tion have not been met, the Commissioner shall issue to the
 
17 owner of record of the patent a certificate of extension, under
 
18 seal, stating the fact and length of the extension and identify­
19 ing the product and the statute under which regulatory
 
20 review occurred and specifying any claim to which such ex­
21 tension is applicable. Such certificate shall be recorded in the
 
22 official file of the patent so extended and shall be considered
 
23 as part of the original patent.
 
24 "(c)As used in this section:
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2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q ■ ■ 
"(1) The term 'product' means any machine, man­
ufacture, or composition of matter of which a patent
 
may be obtained and includes the following:
 
"(A) Any new drug, antibiotic drug, new
 
animal drug, device, food additive, or color addi­
tive subject to regulation under the Federal Food,
 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act;
 
"(B) Any human or veterinary biological
 
product subject to regulation under section 351 of
 
the Public Health Service Act or under the virus,
 
serum, toxin, and analogous products provisions of
 
the Act of Congress of March 4, 1913(21 U.S.C.
 
151-158);
 
"(C) Any pesticide subject to regulation
 
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Ro­
denticide Act; and
 
"(D) any chemical substance or mixture sub­
ject to regulation under the Toxic Substances
 
Control Act.
 
"(2) The term'major health or environmental ef­
fects test' means an experiment to determine or evalu­
ate health or environmental effects which requires at
 
least six months to conduct, not including any period
 
for analysis or conclusions.
 
"(3) The term 'regulatory review period' means—
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"(A) with respect to a product which is a
 
food additive, color additive, new animal drug,
 
veterinary biological product, device, new drug,
 
antibiotic drug, or human biological product, a
 
period commencing on the earliest of the date the
 
patentee, his assignee, or his licensee—
 
"(i) initiates a major health or environ­
mental effects test on such product, the data
 
from which are submitted in an application
 
or petition with respect to such product
 
under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
 
Act, the Public Health Service Act, or the
 
Act of Congress of March 4, 1913,
 
"(ii) claims an exemption for investiga­
tion or requests authority to prepare an ex­
perimental product with respect to such
 
product under such statutes, or
 
"(iii) submits an application or petition
 
with respect to such product under such stat­
utes,
 
and ending on the date such application or peti­
tion with respect to such product is approved or
 
licensed under such statutes or, if objections are
 
filed to such approval or license, ending on the
 
date such objections are resolved and commercial
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10 
15 
20 
25 
8
 
1 marketing is permitted or, if commercial market­
2 ing is initially permitted and later revoked pend­
3 ing further proceedings as a result of such objec­
4 tions, ending on the date such proceedings are fi­
nally resolved and commercial marketing is per­
6 mitted; 
7 "(B) with respect to a product which is a 
8 pesticide, a period commencing on the earliest of 
9 the date the patentee, his assignee, or his 
licensee— 
11 "(i) initiates a major health or environ­
12 mental effects test on such pesticide, the 
13 data from which are submitted in a request 
14 for registration of such pesticide under sec­
tion 3 of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, 
16 and Kodenticide Act, 
17 "(ii) requests the grant of an experimen­
18 tal use permit for such pesticide under sec­
19 tion 5 of such Act, or 
"(iii) submits an application for registra­
21 tion of such pesticide pursuant to section 3 of 
22 such Act, 
23 and ending on the date such pesticide is first reg­
24 istered under section 3 of such Act, either condi­
tionally or fully; and 
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"(C) with respect to a product which is a
 
chemical substance or mixture for which notifica­
tion is required under section 5(a) of the Toxic
 
Substances Control Act—
 
"(i) which is subject to a rule requiring
 
testing under section 4(a) of such Act, a
 
period commencing on the date the patentee,
 
his assignee, or his licensee has initiated the
 
testing required in such rule and ending on
 
the expiration of the premanufacture notifica­
tion period for such chemical substance or
 
mixture, or if an order or injunction is issued
 
under section 5(e) or 5(f) of such Act, the
 
date on which such order or injunction is dis­
solved or set aside;
 
"(ii) which is not subject to testing rule
 
under section 4 of such Act, a period com­
mencing on the earlier of the date the
 
patentee, his assignee, or his licensee—
 
"(I) submits a premanufacture
 
notice, or
 
"(IE) initiates a major health or en­
vironmental effects test on such chemi­
cal substance or mixture, the data from
 
which are included in the premanufac­
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1 ture notice for such substance or mix­
2 ture,
 
3 and ending on the expiration of the premanu­
4 facture notification period for such substance
 
5 or if an order or injunction is issued under
 
6 section 5(e) or 5(f) of such Act, the date on
 
7 which such order or such injunction is dis­
8 solved or set aside;
 
9 except that the regulatory review period shall not be deemed
 
10 to have commenced until a patent has been granted for the
 
11 product which is subject to regulatory review,for the method
 
12 for using such product, or for the method for producing such
 
13 product. In the event the regulatory review period has com­
14 menced prior to the date of enactment of this section, then
 
15 the period of patent extension shall be measured from Janu­
16 ary 3, 1983, or the date the regulatory review period com­
17 mences, whichever occurs later.
 
18 (b)The analysis for chapter 14 of title 35, United States
 
19 Code,is amended by adding at the end the following:
 
''155. Restoration of patent term.".
 
o
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SURVEY
 
My name is Linda Acosta and I am a Graduate Student at
 
California State College in San Bernardino, California,
 
Currently I am involved in writing my Masters' Research
 
Project on which I am doing research into the affects
 
of patent, product substitution and regulatory policies
 
on the behavior of the pharmaceutical industry. Part
 
of my projects requirements are to do some original re
 
search and come to some conclusions based on it. The
 
following are a set of questions I have prepared and sent
 
to 100 randomly selected pharmaceutical companies, I
 
would appreciate your response to all that apply to your
 
company, A pre-addressed, stamped envelope is enclosed
 
for your convenience and to assure anonymity in response
 
results. Thank you for your helping to make my project
 
a success.
 
1 Companies average annual income:
 
less than 100,000 ^100-500,000 ^500,000-1 mil,
 
l-TC mil, 10-25 mil, ^25-50 mil, 50-100 mil, ^over 100 mil.
 
What percentage of income (sales) is allocated for R and D?
 
1-2% 3-5% 6-8% 8-10% more than 10%
 
Does 	your company manufacture generic products? yes no
 
What 	percentage of total sales are generic products? _%
 
Are the generics you manufacture a result of patents
 
once held by your company? _yes no
 
How many new products has you company released on the
 
foreign market in the last ten years?
 
1-2 ^3-5 6-8 : 8-10 10 or more
 
How many new products has your company released in
 
the U,S, market in the last ten years?
 
1-2 3-5 6-8 8-10 10 or more
 
8	 Does your company manufacture drugs outside the U,S,
 
under company name or a subsidiary? yes ^no
 
9 V/hat was the average patent life of new products released
 
on the foreign market? (in years)
 
1 _8 9 ^10 ___11 12 __13 14 15 16 17
 
10 What was the average patent life of new products released
 
in the U.S.? (in years)
 
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
 
11) 	Does your company support the Patent Term Restoration
 
Act of 1983? ' • yes no
 
12) 	If the Patent Term Restoration Act of 1983 were to become
 
law, would your company likely increase its R and D
 
expenditures? yes _no
 
" ■ 	 7n 
13) 	V/hat is tlie average number of years it takes to recoup
 
R and D expenditures once a new drug is released on
 
the market? 1-3 6-9 ^10 or more
 
14) 	What is the average number of pages required on NDAs
 
submitted to the PDA?
 
^less than 20,000 ^20-50,000 ___50-75,000 __75-100,000
 
100-125,000 125,000 or more
 
15) -Would you be in favor or shortening the regulatory
 
review process for NDAs? jres no
 
16) Does your company have a plant located on Puerto Rico?
 
yes no
 
17) 	Rank in order of importance reasons for having a plant
 
located in Puerto Rico:
 
flower pay scales abundance of skilled laborers
 
.tax breaks ^low plant maintenance costs
 
available workforce none of the above
 
18) 	If congress revised the decision to continue allowing
 
tax breaks for manufacturers in Puerto Rico, would
 
your company likely close its plants? yes no
 
19) 	Does your company employ lobbyists? yes no
 
20) 	If yes, at which levels of government: state federal
 
21) 	If state lobbyist are employed, are they employed in
 
all 50 states? yes no
 
22) 	Did recent cutbacks in the state of California's Medi
 
cal formulary effect your companies sales? yes no
 
23) 	If tax laws v/ere passed allowing greater tax advantages
 
to companies who invest a minimum of 10 percent of
 
total sales in R and D would your company likely begin
 
or increase R and D expenditures? yes no
 
24) 	Did your company support the Orphan Drug Bill? yes ^no
 
25) 	Does your company now manufacture any drugs as a re
 
sult 	of passage of that bill? yes ^no
 
26) 	Is your company currently involved in research for any
 
rare disease that might fall into the Orphan Drug category?
 
yes no
 
Please add any comments you feel would assist me in my project.
 
THANK YOU
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